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Case Note
Court of Justice of the European Communities
Decisions of 12 September 2006, Case C-145/04, Spain v. United
Kingdom, and Case C-300/04, Eman and Sevinger v. College van
Burgemeester en Wethouders van Den Haag
Jo Shaw*
Introduction: The political representation of European citizens
What is a ‘European’ Parliament and who should vote for it? Should it be the
‘citizens’ of the European Union alone? If so, should it be all EU citizens, or only
those who are resident in the member states? Or should the electorate include
potentially all residents in the member states which comprise the EU and who are
thus affected by decisions taken in the Parliament? Does anyone have a ‘right’ to
vote for the European Parliament? And who should decide who votes for the
European Parliament – the member states, or the EU itself? In other words, is
there a single European concept of the European Parliamentary demos, or twenty-
seven separate, but overlapping, national concepts?
Moreover, since EU law, under Article 19(2) EC, now requires all member
states to accord to nationals of the other member states resident in their territory
the right to vote for the European Parliament on the same basis as nationals (i.e.,
a non-discrimination right), does this create an exhaustive framework for a ‘Euro-
pean’ definition of the European Parliamentary demos, or merely a facilitative frame-
work within which member states may add to, but not take away from, the basic
rights laid down in the Treaty and the subsequent directive? If the member states
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may add to the categories of voters for the European Parliament, such as by allow-
ing voting by resident third country nationals, are they subject in that context to
any constraints under EU law? In a similar vein, what is the territorial scope of the
European Parliamentary demos? To what extent is it circumscribed by the outer
geographical boundaries of the EU, as set by Article 299 EC, or can those covered
by the personal scope of Union citizenship also quite properly vote for the Euro-
pean Parliament when they are resident in a third state, or in some associated
territory which is not fully part of the EU? If so, is that a matter for decision by the
EU institutions under the Treaties or for the member states, and – if the latter – is
their discretion on external voting1  entirely unfettered, or subject to general prin-
ciples of EU law?
The Act on Direct Elections, originally adopted in 1976 and subsequently
amended on a number of occasions,2  lays down some limited ‘uniform’ aspects of
elections to the European Parliament, with other matters left at the present time
to the member states. In 2006, the nature of European Parliamentary voting rights
came under scrutiny in two cases which came before the Court of Justice, both of
which arose in the context of deep-rooted political contestation within and be-
tween the member states. However, these cases articulate important messages about
the nature of political representation in the EU, and also – indirectly – about the
nature of European citizenship as a political, as well as socio-economic, concept.
To put these cases and the issues they raise in context, it is important to set out in
some detail the background to the evolution of political representation in the EU.
The history of political representation in the EU
The struggle to ensure effective political representation of European citizens in
the context of European integration has a very long history. While the roots of a
political and (especially) legal discourse of European citizenship can be traced
back to the late 1960s when Commission Vice President Levi Sandri referred to
the development of a body of rules relating to the free movement of workers as ‘an
incipient form – still embryonic and imperfect – of European citizenship’,3  de-
bates in the European Parliament around universal suffrage as the basis for direct
elections go back even further, to the inception of the Assembly itself. The history
1 For an extended discussion of external voting see R. Bauböck, ‘Stakeholder Citizenship and
Transnational Political Participation: A Normative Evaluation of External Voting’, Fordham Law
Review (2007), p. 2393.
2 For the latest version of the Act on Direct Elections, see Council Decision amending the Act
concerning the election of the representatives of the European Parliament by direct universal suf-
frage, annexed to Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom, OJ [2002] L 283/1.
3 See Bull. EC 11/68, at 5-6.
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of electoral rights in the EU has thus always been linked not only to the debate
about the emergence of a concept of European citizenship which builds upon the
longstanding free movement rights, but also to a predominantly inter-institu-
tional discourse about democratization of the European institutions, notably the
European Parliament.
According to Article 21(1) of the ECSC Treaty dating back to 1951:
The Assembly shall consist of delegates whom the Parliaments of each of the
member states shall be called upon to appoint once a year from among their own
membership, or who shall be elected by direct universal suffrage, according to the
procedure determined by each respective High Contracting Party.
This reference to ‘direct universal suffrage’ marked the start of the Parliament’s
debate on voting rights. From 1960 onwards, the idea of direct elections to the
Parliament animated the Parliament as it focused on, and used arguments about,
‘building Europe’4  and establishing democratic structures to support this aim.5
In 1960, the Parliament adopted a proposal for a uniform electoral procedure for
direct elections to the European Parliament, including the proposal that elections
by direct universal suffrage would include the right of nationals of the member
states to vote in member states other than their own,6  but it dropped this contro-
versial suggestion in the next version of its proposal on the uniform electoral
procedure, which was a more minimal text adopted in 1975 with a view to facili-
tating as quickly as possible the initiation of direct elections which were eventu-
ally held in 1979.7  However, the notion reappeared again in the 1982 proposal,
but that was once again not adopted by the Council.8  The basis for the Parliament’s
work in this area lay in what was then Article 138(3) EEC (now Article 190 EC as
amended), which mandated the Parliament to propose, for unanimous adoption
by the Council of Ministers, proposals for the election of the Parliament by direct
universal suffrage.
Although the Parliament received support from certain quarters for direct elec-
tions,9  it encountered opposition in other places. A principal reason for this was
4 Ninth General Report on the Activities of the Community, 1 Feb. 1960 to 31 Jan. 1961.
5 ‘The European Parliament demands that the application of the principles of a constitutional
theory based on democracy and the primacy of the law should be reinforced in order to ensure the
future development of the Community’, see 4 Bulletin de la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et
de l’Acier, Chronologie Années 1950-1960, Luxembourg 1967, at 68.
6 The proposal is to be found in a Resolution dated 17 May 1960, Journal Officiel 1960, 834,
Art. 7.
7 A. Evans, ‘European Citizenship: A Novel Concept in EEC Law’, American Journal of Com-
parative Law (1984), p. 679 at 705.
8 OJ [1982] C 87/61.
9 The Italian government introduced measures concerning the direct election of Italian mem-
bers of the European parliament, and in 1968 Christian Democrat MEPs asked the Italian govern-
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the belief that under the founding Treaties the Parliament did not have sufficient
powers to justify it being directly elected. By contrast parliamentarians themselves
tended to think it would be undemocratic for the powers of the Parliament to be
augmented without it first being directly elected. This conflict reached a pinnacle
with the Commission’s 1972 report on The Enlargement of the Powers of the Euro-
pean Parliament.10  Whilst the Parliament inclined towards the view that it should
be directly elected and that subsequently as the most democratic body in the
Community it should have stronger powers, the report concluded that the powers
of the Parliament should be increased first. It found that ‘The new powers would,
of their very nature, constitute means of influencing events in such a way as to
promote the application of Article 138 of the EEC Treaty.’11
The governments of Belgium and Italy were the first to consider the direct
election of their own members of the European Parliament, and bills to provide
for such direct elections were brought before their parliaments. Moreover, Article
4 of the proposed law for direct elections put before the Belgian parliament pro-
vided that ‘nationals of the member states of the European Communities who
have their residence in Belgium may take part in the elections to the European
Parliament under the same conditions as Belgian citizens.’12  This helped to launch
the idea of extending the boundaries of the suffrage in European elections at the
same time as instituting direct elections. The Parliament took up Belgium’s posi-
tion with regard to the universal right to vote in European elections and was
sympathetic to the right to vote in elections in the place of residence.13  On the
other hand, the Commission did not refer to the right to vote and stand in Euro-
pean elections as one of the ‘special’ rights connected with (European) citizenship
in a 1975 report14  and this was undoubtedly because the question of direct elec-
tions to the Parliament remained at that time contested and the project incom-
plete.
When the first direct elections to the Parliament did eventually take place in
1979, after the adoption of the Council Act on Direct Elections,15  nationals of
ment to invite other European governments to begin the direct election of their members; see Cahiers
de documentation européenne, oct.-déc. 1968, Parlement Européen, p. 69; the Luxembourg Socialist
Party made it a standing stipulation that there should be direct elections to the EP and in 1969, it
called on the government to table a bill to this effect. European documentation – a survey, April-
June 1969, European Parliament, p. 67.
10 Vedel Report, Bull. EC Supp. 4/72.
11 Vedel Report at p. 60.
12 Patijn Report, EP Working Doc. 368/74, 13 Jan. 1975, p. 43.
13 See Art. 7 of the Parliament’s draft Convention on direct universal elections.
14 See Bull. EC Supp. 7/75, esp. point 2.2.2.
15 Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom relating to the Act concerning the election
of the representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage, OJ [1976] L 278/1.
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the member states resident in another member state were not able to vote, unless
this had been provided for at national level.16  The only provision at European
level on this matter was a prohibition on double voting,17  which was largely aimed
at those with dual nationality, as they are the group historically most likely to
double vote. This was just one of the several respects in which the vocation of
Article 138(3) EEC to see the adoption of a uniform electoral procedure as the
basis for the elections based on direct universal suffrage was sacrificed on the altar
of political expediency, in order to secure agreement amongst the nine member
states, some of whom feared interferences in their national sovereignty as one of
the consequences of direct elections.18  For example, the United Kingdom feared
that it might be forced to introduce a form of proportional representation as its
electoral system.19  However, in the meantime what is now Article 190 EC has
been amended to provide that ‘the representatives in the European Parliament of
the peoples of the States brought together in the Community shall be elected by
direct universal suffrage’, thus constitutionalising direct elections. Moreover, the
European Parliament continues to be mandated to draw up proposals for a uni-
form procedure for direct elections, under Article 190(4) EC, but in practice the
elements of that uniform procedure remain incomplete and do not affect any
issues of suffrage definition at the national level.
Soon after the first direct elections, the Parliament settled down once again to
examine the criteria for extending the right to vote as an entitlement under EU
law. The Seitlinger report20  suggested that member states ought to give the right
to vote in European elections to those nationals of other member states who had
been resident in that state for five years or more, whereas nationals of member
states who had not resided in the host member state for five years should be given
the right to vote by their home state in their home state (i.e., external voting, but
in the country of origin). The right to stand for election was to be guaranteed in
the member state of nationality alone. The report justified the right to vote in the
member state of residence by the principle of long-term residence. However, the
16 S. O’Leary, The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship (The Hague, Kluwer 1996)
p. 207.
17 Art. 8; this is also laid down in Art. 4 of Directive 93/109 supra n. 29.
18 G. van den Berghe, ‘Direct Elections in Accordance with a Uniform Procedure’, European
Law Review (1979), p. 331.
19 Except in Northern Ireland, where it introduced PR based on a single transferable vote from
the very beginning, the UK maintained a first past the post constituency system until the 1999
European Elections, when it introduced the d’Hondt system for multi-member constituencies un-
der the European Parliament Elections Act 1999: D. Farrell and R. Scully, ‘Electing the European
Parliament: How Uniform are “Uniform” Electoral Systems?’, Journal of Common Market Studies
(2005), p. 969.
20 Seitlinger Report, draft text on the electoral procedure, A1-988/81, 26 Feb. 1982.
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Parliament in plenary took a different approach. It maintained that the right to
vote should be a right conferred by the member state of nationality alone.21  On
the other hand, however, the Parliament did propose that the right to stand for
election should be given by the country of residence after five years; this would
have meant that an individual could stand in an election and in a country where
he or she could not actually vote.22  The Council did consider the Seitlinger report
and the Draft Act several times within the Committee of Permanent Representa-
tives (COREPER) but no further action was taken.23  Overall, the voting rights
debate was a victim of an advanced level of stagnation in the European Commu-
nity at the time, a stagnation which also ensnared the parallel debate about ‘spe-
cial rights’ for European citizens.
Following the second set of European elections in 1984, and with the aim of
reviving the debate within the Council, the Parliament started work on a new
proposal on the electoral procedure.24  In an opinion, the Political Affairs Com-
mittee had made a clear proposal on external voting in European elections, stating
that
Nationals of a Member State shall be entitled to vote in the country of which they
are nationals. The Member States shall take all the necessary measures to enable
their nationals whose place of residence is outside their country of origin to exer-
cise their electoral rights without hindrance in the Member State of which they
are nationals.25
Meanwhile, the Adonnino Committee, set up in 1984 after the Fontainebleau
European Council, comprising personal representatives of the heads of state and
government and their foreign ministers and tasked with developing concrete sug-
gestions to implement a People’s Europe and thereby to enhance ‘European iden-
tity’, argued in its first report to the European Council that
It is desirable to increase the citizen’s involvement in and understanding of the po-
litical process in the Community institutions [and that] the electoral procedure …
21 See Art. 5 of the Parliament’s Draft Act on a uniform electoral procedure, adopted by Resolu-
tion on 10 March 1982, OJ [1982] C 87/61. If the national has left the territory of the member state
this, of course, raises the question of expatriate voting, and the degree of connection which expatri-
ates should have before voting. Clearly to institute such an electoral rule by means of the uniform
electoral procedure would have been as substantial an interference in national sovereignty as the
institution of electoral rights for non-nationals.
22 Art. 6 of the Draft Act.
23 See the further Resolution of the European Parliament of 9 March 1983, deploring the lack
of action on the part of the Council of Ministers before the 1984 elections, OJ [1983] C 96/28.
24 Bocklet report, EP Working Doc., A2-1/85.
25 Supra n. 24, Art. 2(i).
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shall ensure either that a citizen should be entitled to vote for candidates from his
own country …, or that a citizen residing in another Member State should be al-
lowed to vote for candidates from that Member State (emphasis added).26
The report recommended that discussion of the matter should continue, but at
the same time made it categorically clear that the subject remained within the
competence of the member states to decide, a view regularly endorsed by the
Council.27
Notwithstanding these extensive discussions, the first concrete legal develop-
ments regarding the nature and scope of the right to vote of nationals of the
member states in European Parliament elections came not with changes to the
arrangements for direct elections, but with the Treaty of Maastricht and the insti-
tution of citizenship of the Union through Article 17 EC et seq. In terms of
political rights, EU citizenship saw the introduction of limited equal treatment
rights for nationals of the member states in local and European Parliamentary
elections in Article 19 EC. Thus, as is well-known, Article 19(2) EC provides:
Without prejudice to Article 190(4) and to provisions adopted for its implemen-
tation, every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a
national shall have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the
European Parliament in the Member State in which he resides, under the same
conditions as nationals of that State. This right shall be exercised subject to de-
tailed arrangements adopted by the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal
from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament; these ar-
rangements may provide for derogation where warranted by problems specific to a
Member State.28
Article 19(2) was implemented through a directive adopted in 1993,29  which
specifically addresses the issue of the equal treatment rights of EU citizens resident
in ‘the Member State of residence’ (Article 3). Article 1(2) preserves the powers of
member states in relation to the regulation of external or expatriate voting, pro-
viding that ‘nothing in this Directive shall affect each Member State’s provisions
concerning the right to vote or to stand as a candidate of its nationals who reside
outside its electoral territory.’ Since that date, the Article 19(2) rights have been
applied in three European Parliament elections (1994, 1999 and 2004), and on
26 Bull. EC Supp. 7/85 – A People’s Europe; see also the Commission’s response in Bull. EC Supp.
2/88.
27 O’Leary, supra n. 16, at p. 236.
28 Art. 19(1) EC sets out a similarly worded equal treatment guarantee in relation to the right to
vote and stand in local elections for EU citizens resident in another member state.
29 Directive 93/109/EC, OJ [1993] L 329/34. Art. 19(1) is implemented through Directive 94/
80/EC, OJ [1994] L 368/38.
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each occasion the Commission has issued a report on the experience, which has
concentrated on the effectiveness of the modalities for ensuring that the right to
vote in the host member state has been protected under EU law. It has not focused
its attention on the nature of the ‘right to vote’ in European Parliamentary elec-
tions, as such.
Against this background we can now consider the issues raised in the Gibraltar
and Aruba cases, which do – finally – shed some light upon the nature of that
‘right to vote’.
The Gibraltar and Aruba cases
The Gibraltar case30  dealt with the question whether Commonwealth citizens
resident in Gibraltar should be able to vote in European Parliament elections,
given that they were enfranchised under a parallel extension of UK’s standard
suffrage rules which give Commonwealth citizens who are legally resident the
right to vote and stand in all elections in the United Kingdom.31  This situation
arose after the United Kingdom included Gibraltar in its electoral territory as a
result of a case brought before the European Court of Human Rights in the 1990s
regarding the right to vote in European Parliament elections by UK citizens in
Gibraltar, and the status of the European Parliament as a legislature vis-à-vis
Gibraltar. The case was brought by Spain under Article 227 EC, which argued
that the right to vote in European Parliament elections must be confined to EU
citizens. The Aruba case32  came before the Court of Justice by way of a reference
for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC from the Dutch Raad van State, in
a case brought by two Netherlands nationals resident in Aruba, who objected to a
decision of the municipal authorities of The Hague refusing to place their names
on the electoral register for European Parliament elections in the Netherlands.
The two cases were not joined, as such, but a single Opinion was delivered in
April 2006 by Advocate-General Tizzano, and the two judgments were delivered
on the same day in September 2006 and share many elements in common. For
the purposes of this presentation, it is useful to begin by setting out in more detail
the background to the Gibraltar case, before moving on to consider the situation
which arose in Aruba. Thereafter, the findings of the Advocate-General and the
Court of Justice will be examined, and the implications of these findings drawn
out.
30 Case C-145/04 Spain v. United Kingdom, 12 Sept. 2006.
31 For details of the UK franchise, see House of Commons Library, Standard Note, Electoral
Franchise: Who can Vote?, SN/PC/2208, 1 March 2005.
32 Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger v. College van burgemeester en wethouders van Den Haag,
12 Sept. 2006.
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The Gibraltar case
Annex II of the 1976 Act on Direct Elections provides that ‘The United Kingdom
will apply the provisions of this Act only in respect of the United Kingdom.’33
This excluded a territory such as Gibraltar. Denise Matthews, a resident of Gibraltar,
complained that she was not permitted to register as a voter for the European
Parliament elections of 1994, even though she is a UK citizen and thus an EU
citizen. This, she alleged, was a breach of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), which
obliges states to hold free and fair elections ensuring the free expression of the
people in the choice of the legislature.
Gibraltar has been a dependent territory and Crown Colony of the United
Kingdom since the early 18th century, when it was ceded to the British Crown by
the King of Spain under the Treaty of Utrecht. Gibraltar’s situation with regard to
the EU is rather anomalous. It is not part of the United Kingdom, as a Crown
Colony, but it is part of the European Union by virtue of Article 299(4) EC, as a
European territory for whose external relations a member state is responsible.
However, it is not part of the customs territory and is treated as a third country for
the purposes of the common commercial policy. On the other hand, many EU
legislative acts in the areas such as the free movement of persons, services and
capital and the protection of the environment and consumers do apply to Gibraltar
and become part of the legal order of Gibraltar in the same way as they do in
relation to the member states. Since the Act on Direct Elections did not appear to
be reviewable before the Court of Justice as an act of the member states, Matthews
turned to the ECHR in order to seek a remedy. By virtue of a declaration made in
1953 by the United Kingdom, the ECHR is applicable to Gibraltar.
In a judgment of 18 February 1999,34  the Court of Human Rights found that
the United Kingdom was in principle responsible for any violation even though
the infringement originated in the Act concerning the Election of the Representa-
tives of the European Parliament by Direct Universal Suffrage. The fact that the
EU electoral machinery is decided at EU level and not at national level does not in
principle absolve a state of responsibility under the ECHR. Furthermore Article 3
could be applied to elections to the European Parliament even though this was
not envisaged when the ECHR was originally drafted. The European Parliament
should now be viewed as at least part of the ‘legislature’ of the EU, this being an
essential precondition for applying Article 3. Especially since the Treaty of
Maastricht, the Parliament has played an important role within the EU’s legisla-
tive process, for many if not all legislative acts, and its role in general can be
33 See supra n. 15.
34 ECtHR 18 February 1999, Case No. 24833/94, Matthews v. United Kingdom.
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connected to the task of ensuring an effective political democracy in the EU.
Finally, the United Kingdom could not invoke its ‘margin of appreciation’ in
deciding that in order to apply its European Parliamentary electoral system it had
to exclude Gibraltar, just because its population was too small to be a full Euro-
pean Parliament constituency (at the time there was single constituency, first-
past-the-post voting in the UK for European Parliament elections).
The UK’s initial reaction was to seek an amendment to Annex II of the 1976
Act of Direct Elections in order to include Gibraltar, but this avenue (which would
require unanimity amongst the member states) was blocked by Spain on the basis
of its sovereignty dispute with the United Kingdom. As a result the United King-
dom caused the following statement to be included in the minutes of a meeting of
the Council of Ministers on 18 February 2002:35
Recalling Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union, which states that ‘Union
shall respect the fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome
on 4 November 1950, and as they result from the constitutional traditions com-
mon to the Member States, as general principles of Community law’, the United
Kingdom will ensure that the necessary changes are made to enable the Gibraltar
electorate to vote in elections to the European Parliament as part of and on the
same terms as the electorate of an existing United Kingdom constituency, in order
to ensure the fulfillment of the United Kingdom’s obligations to implement the
judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in [Matthews], consistent with
European law.
Accordingly, in 2003, the United Kingdom adopted legislation enabling elections
for the European Parliament to take place in Gibraltar from 2004 onwards in the
form of the European Parliament Representation Act 2003, and it incorporated
the voters of Gibraltar into the South West of England multi-member constitu-
ency for the June 2004 elections, on advice from the Electoral Commission.36  In
addition to any EU citizens entitled to vote under Article 19(2) EC, in line with
the general position on the suffrage in the United Kingdom, certain qualified
Commonwealth citizens resident in Gibraltar were entitled to register and vote.
This admittedly small group of Commonwealth citizens (around 100-200 per-
sons, most of whom are from South Asia) would inevitably be third-country na-
tionals and not EU citizens, unless they were Maltese or Cypriot and thus entitled
to vote as EU citizens.
35 This procedure is detailed in AG Tizzano’s Opinion, 6 April 2006, paras. 32-34.
36 ‘Gibraltar should join South West for elections to European Parliament,’ 28 Aug. 2003,
<www.gibnet.com/eurovote/ec_aug.htm>.
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Spain has long contested the UK’s claim to sovereignty over Gibraltar, espe-
cially during the Franco era when the land border was closed.37  Since Spain be-
came a member of what were then the European Communities in 1986, some of
the disputes between Spain and the United Kingdom over Gibraltar have been
filtered through the prism of the application of EU law in Gibraltar. In this in-
stance, the extension of votes to Commonwealth citizens became the focal point
of Spain’s objections.38  Spain filed a complaint with the European Commission
in July 2003, stating that the UK measures violated EU law, in particular Articles
17, 19, 189 and 190 EC, and Annex II of the Act on Direct Elections, because the
franchise to vote in European Parliament elections as determined under the UK
legislation was not confined to persons who are EU citizens. In October 2003, the
Commission held an oral hearing involving Spain and the United Kingdom, and
concluded that there was no violation by the United Kingdom. In the absence of
specific rules in the franchise in the EU measures which provide for direct elec-
tions, the Commission concluded that there was ‘no general principle of Com-
munity law according to which the electorate in European Parliament elections
cannot be extended beyond EU citizens.’39  Arguing – as indeed is obvious after
the Matthews case – that Annex II of the 1976 Act on Direct Elections must be
interpreted in the light of the ECHR, the Commission furthermore concluded
that this was a provision which was sufficiently open to allow the United King-
dom to assimilate Gibraltar to the electoral territory of England and Wales in
order to comply with its obligations under the ECHR. It suggested that Spain and
the United Kingdom find a friendly resolution to their dispute without recourse
to law, and declined the Spanish request that it adopt a reasoned opinion stating
violations of EU law on the part of the United Kingdom. Since the Commission
refused to take action under Article 226 EC, Spain decided to take the unusual
step of starting an enforcement action itself in the Court of Justice, under Article
227 EC, without the support of the Commission.
The Aruba case
The Aruba case raised the right to vote in European Parliament elections of citi-
zens of the Kingdom of the Netherlands who are resident in the island territory of
37 See N. Ho, ‘A Rocky Road: The Political Fate of Gibraltar’, Harvard International Review,
Winter 2004 <http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1177/>; ‘The Issues Explained: Gibraltar’, 4 Aug. 2004
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/theissues/article/0,,602017,00.html>.
38 ‘Spain says Gibraltar vote illegal’, BBC News, 5 July 2005 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
uk_politics/4651815.stm>; ‘Fears over Commonwealth EU voters’, BBC News, 6 April 2006 <http:
//news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4882790.stm>. See for more details, House of Commons Li-
brary Research Paper, Gibraltar: Diplomatic and Constitutional Developments, 06/48, 11 Oct. 2006,
esp. p. 36-43.
39 ‘Right to vote in EP elections in Gibraltar’, IP/03/1479, 29 Oct. 2003.
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Aruba, which is just off the coast of Venezuela. Aruba is part of the Kingdom of
the Netherlands, but is a self-governing overseas territory (OCT) and as such is
not part of the EU under Article 299 EC.40  As an OCT, only very limited aspects
of EU law apply to Aruba, either directly or indirectly by virtue of Dutch law, or
in some cases voluntarily because the Aruban legislature has chosen to align itself
with EU law.41  The Euratom Treaty does apply there, as, arguably, does the Part
VI of the Treaty on EU (third pillar on police and judicial co-operation in crimi-
nal matters) which has no territorial scope but merely binds the governments of
the member states. As citizens of the Kingdom of the Netherlands benefiting from
a single national citizenship for the Kingdom (which extends also to the Dutch
Antilles) but with permanent residence in Aruba, the applicants Eman and Sevinger
argued that they were citizens of the Union. However, so long as they were resi-
dent in Aruba under Dutch law they are denied the right to vote in European
Parliament elections. They could vote if they moved to reside in the Netherlands
itself, or if they moved to live in a third country. In the latter case, their rights
would be based on the general Dutch external voting arrangements which make
no distinction in respect of Netherlands nationals who are resident in third coun-
tries as to whether they have previously been resident in the Netherlands itself, or
in Aruba or the other non-European territory of the Netherlands, the Nether-
lands Antilles. In accordance with Article 1(2) of Directive 93/109, which pre-
serves the discretion of the member states in relation to external voting rights, the
Netherlands is one state which does grant voting rights to its citizens when they
reside in third countries, with the justification that this preserves the link between
the expatriated citizen and the home state.
The conclusions of the Advocate-General and the findings of
the Court of Justice
The Advocate-General’s advice to the Court of Justice was that:
– it should declare, in the Gibraltar case, that the United Kingdom has failed
to fulfil its obligations under the EC Treaty, and in particular the Decision
40 For political background on Aruba, see M. Sharpe, ‘Globalization and Migration: Post-Colo-
nial Dutch Antillean and Aruban Immigrant Political Incorporation in the Netherlands’, Dialectical
Anthropology (2005), p. 291. Further evidence of discontent in relation to political representation
issues in Aruba can be derived from the fact that the same applicants, who are prominent members
of an Aruban political party, the AVP, brought an action before the European Court of Human
Rights against a refusal on the part of the Netherlands authorities to register them as voters for the
Netherlands national assembly. The action was declared inadmissible as manifestly unfounded by
the Court on 6 Sept. 2007 (Eman and Sevinger v. Netherlands, Appl. Nos. 17173/07 and 17180/07).
I am grateful to Leonard Besselink for drawing my attention to these cases.
41 Opinion of the Advocate-General, para. 159.
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relating to the Act on Direct Elections, by allowing Commonwealth citi-
zens resident in Gibraltar to vote in European Parliament elections, and
that
– it should rule, in the Aruba case, that it is contrary to EU law for a member
state to withhold (without objective justification) the right to vote in Euro-
pean Parliament elections from citizens residing in another part of the state
other than the European territory, when it grants that right to vote to citi-
zens when they are resident in the European territory and when they are
resident in a non-member state. This would leave it open to the member
state to provide such an objective justification, but in this case the Nether-
lands had failed to satisfy that requirement.
The Court of Justice differed slightly in its approach to the two cases from the
AG. In the first place, its judgment does not contain an extended discussion of the
citizenship and constitutional issues which are raised by the cases. To that extent,
it is hard to say with certainty whether it might approve of some of the more
general statements made by the AG which will be discussed below. Furthermore,
while adopting essentially the same ruling as proposed by the AG in the Aruba
case on the rights of the Arubans, it found in favour of the United Kingdom in the
Gibraltar case, concluding that in the arrangements that it made it had not ex-
ceeded its discretion under EU law as it stands. The discussion which follows
presents first the broader approach presented by the AG, and then highlights the
narrower solutions offered by the Court of Justice. Of course the former’s ap-
proach is not the definitive statement of the law as it stands, but is merely an
advisory Opinion, but it is interesting to study this Opinion because it may pro-
vide some pointers as to how EU law in this field might develop in the future.
The AG’s Opinion offers the first extended consideration by a judicial author-
ity in the EU of the political rights of Union citizens, insofar as it discusses the
nature of European citizenship as a political status. The AG began his discussion
with a general meditation on whether a right to vote in European Parliament
elections is one of the EU citizenship rights guaranteed under the EC Treaty. Such
a reflection was not strictly essential for the task of deciding the case (as the omis-
sion of any such discussion from the Court’s judgment clearly shows), but it pro-
vides vital background for understanding the underlying position on the nature
of EU citizenship which the AG chose to take, as his argument focuses on the
legitimate extensions and restrictions which member states may grant or impose,
taking as a baseline a premise that the right to vote in European Parliament elec-
tions is indeed an incident of citizenship of the Union.
The AG’s first finding was that
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it can be directly inferred from Community principles and legislation as a whole,
thus overriding any indications to the contrary within national legislation, that
there is an obligation to grant the voting rights [in European elections] to citizens
of the Member States and, consequently, to citizens of the Union.42
He reached that conclusion even though no provision of EU law explicitly in-
cludes the right to vote for the European Parliament amongst the list of rights
inherent in citizenship of the Union, although Article 19(2) ‘in any event takes it
for granted that the right … is available to citizens of the Union.’43  He argues that
the right is based on
the principles of democracy on which the Union is based,44  and in particular, to
use the words of the [European Court of Human Rights] the principle of univer-
sal suffrage, which ‘has become the basic principle’ in modern democratic
states.45
In the arena of EU law, this finding can also be derived from the references to
universal suffrage in Articles 189 and 190 EC, and Article 1 of the 1976 Act on
direct elections, which militate ‘in favour of recognition of a right to vote attach-
ing to the largest possible number of people.’46  The AG finally supported the
argument by reference to Article 3 of the Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR, which was
the foundation for the Matthews judgment, protecting ‘the free expression of the
opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.’
The AG on the Gibraltar case
The AG then considered whether there was a ‘strict link’ between citizenship of
the Union and the scope of the electorate for the European Parliament, as argued
by the Spanish Government, as the basis for contesting the extension of the suf-
frage to Commonwealth citizens in Gibraltar. The AG concluded that the refer-
ence to ‘peoples’ of the member states in Articles 189 and 190 should be treated as
largely coterminous with the citizens or nationals of the member states (thus avoid-
ing alternative ‘ethnic’ rather than ‘civic’ connotations of the term ‘peoples’), but
that the people/citizens, so defined, and the electorate for the European Parlia-
42 Ibid., para. 67.
43 Ibid., para. 68.
44 Art. 6(1) EU provides that ‘The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy,
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are com-
mon to the Member States.’
45 Opinion, para. 69. In the ECHR case-law see, for example, Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2),
Appl. No. 74025/01, judgment of 5 Oct. 2005, at para. 60.
46 Opinion, para. 69.
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ment should not be treated as automatically coextensive. He based that approach
on the fact that member states can and do place restrictions on the right to vote,
even for citizens (e.g., age or competence criteria), and that – albeit less often –
they can also deploy a more generous approach to the suffrage, including certain
categories of non-nationals within it. This is the case in the United Kingdom with
Commonwealth citizens. Interestingly, the AG also referred to the fact that EU
law does not itself treat the rights it ascribes citizens of the Union as exclusive,
citing Articles 194 and 195 EC as examples of rights (to complain to the Om-
budsman or to petition the European Parliament) which are ascribed also to natu-
ral and legal persons resident in the member states,47  and he noted that it would
be paradoxical if the member states were to remain the ultimate gatekeepers of the
personal scope of Union citizenship, by virtue of the link between Union citizen-
ship and nationality of a member state in Article 17 EC, whilst not at the same
time being free to ascribe at least some of those rights of Union citizenship to non-
nationals.48  In other words, it would be odd if the member states were in an all-
or-nothing situation where they could extend all the rights of Union citizenship
to a person by allowing them to acquire national citizenship, but they could not,
acting autonomously, ascribe a subgroup of those rights to non-citizens.
Rejecting the Spanish argument, the AG denied that allowing the extension of
Union citizenship rights to non-nationals of the member states would ‘“dismem-
ber” the unicity of the concept of citizenship’.49  He also appeared (albeit implic-
itly) to refer approvingly to the general principle of alien suffrage by commenting
positively upon how the principle of universal suffrage seems to demand voting
rights for the largest possible number of persons including ‘possibly also for for-
eigners established in a particular State, who, like citizens, are effectively subject
to the measures approved by the national and Community legislative authori-
ties.’50  The AG also accepted pragmatically that in the absence of a uniform elec-
toral procedure there was indeed no consistency among the member states as to
the rules which govern the entitlement to vote for the European Parliament.51
It might have been expected, given the conclusions he reached, that the AG
would find in favour of the UK’s extension of the franchise to allow Common-
wealth Citizens resident in Gibraltar to vote in European Parliament elections,
even though that group of persons cannot vote in legislative elections for the
Gibraltar Assembly.52  However, the AG insisted that there are limitations upon
47 Ibid., para. 91.
48 Ibid., para. 82.
49 Ibid., para. 92.
50 Ibid., para. 93.
51 Ibid., para. 100.
52 Government of Gibraltar, House of Assembly Ordinance, 1950-19, s.3, available from
<www.gibraltarlaws.gov.gi>.
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the freedom of the member states to determine the scope of the right to vote for
the European Parliament, in particular because such elections are not one-off af-
fairs affecting only one member state, but rather are matters which affect all the
member states.53  Consequently, he stressed that the power may be exercised ‘only
exceptionally’ and ‘within limits and under conditions which are compatible with
Community law.’54  He cited an example of extensions to persons who had no
actual link with the Community (which cannot surely cover the Commonwealth
citizens in Gibraltar, who are affected in the same way as other residents by EU
legislation) which would not be permissible, and also referred to the principles of
reasonableness, proportionality and non-discrimination as governing the compli-
ance of the national rules with EU law. In that sense, the AG saw the situation
quite differently to the United Kingdom which referred, in its declaration on this
matter, to the extension of the right to vote to Gibraltar ‘on the same terms’ as the
electorate of an existing UK constituency.55
The reference to compatibility with EU law guided the AG to a consideration
of the specifics of Annex II of the Act on Direct Elections. This is a text which, as
noted above, originally excluded Gibraltar from the scope of European Parlia-
ment elections and a text which remains, to this day, unamended. It was in rela-
tion to compliance with Annex II that he found support for the Spanish case, for
in effect all of the measures adopted by the United Kingdom to give Gibraltarians
the vote were adopted in breach of the formal text of Annex II. First of all, the AG
rejected the contentions of the Spanish Government that when implementing the
Matthews judgment by facilitating the participation of Gibraltarians in the Euro-
pean Parliament elections, the UK should not have included Gibraltar in another
UK-based constituency, provided for the establishment of the necessary electoral
register, made it possible physically to vote in the dominion, or allowed for legal
proceedings to be possible in Gibraltar to contest the elections should an irregu-
larity have occurred.56  It was right and proper for it to do all these things. How-
ever, as the United Kingdom was adopting the relevant unilateral measures
essentially in order to comply with a fundamental rights imperative as established
in the Matthews case, he concluded that it should not take any measures in rela-
tion to Gibraltar which did not necessarily follow from this mandate or impera-
tive. He argued that the
53 Opinion, para. 102.
54 Ibid., para. 103.
55 See supra n. 35.
56 Opinion, para. 125-126.
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extension [of the franchise to Commonwealth citizens] does not stem from the
need to ensure the exercise of a fundamental right and … therefore a derogation
from Annex II is not justified.57
On this point, therefore, the AG suggested that the Court should find in favour of
Spain. He made that finding notwithstanding having concluded that there was
nothing in the general principles concerned with citizenship and democracy em-
bodied in Articles 17, 19, 189 and 190 EC which precluded the United Kingdom
adopting the measures that it chose to adopt. Interestingly enough, the AG ap-
peared to find a pathway through the relevant legal provisions allowing him to
conclude that while it was permissible for the United Kingdom to give Common-
wealth Citizens the right to vote in European Parliament elections in ‘mainland’
United Kingdom (and indeed Spain had not sought to argue this), it was in breach
of its EU obligations in so doing in Gibraltar.
The AG on the Aruba case
The AG’s coverage of the issues in the Aruba case is somewhat briefer, and draws
upon the general principles articulated in the first part of the Opinion about the
nature of the right to vote in European Parliament elections under EU law, the
role of member states in this respect, and the scope of limitations and restrictions
which they may impose. In this case, the case concerned limitations on the right
to vote of Union citizens in European Parliament elections, specifically a limita-
tion imposed upon Netherlands nationals resident in Aruba. Arubans share a single
national citizenship with all other Netherlands nationals (whether resident in the
Netherlands or in third countries), but they are denied the right to vote in either
‘domestic’ Dutch or European Parliament elections. The AG concluded that while
normally speaking a member state may withhold the right to vote in European
Parliament elections from certain groups of citizens, where this can be objectively
justified, here there was no objective justification for the distinction drawn. The
relevant distinction was not between Netherlands nationals resident in the Neth-
erlands and those resident in Aruba, but rather between Netherlands nationals
resident in Aruba and those, previously resident in Aruba, who had moved to
another member state or indeed a third state, without having previously estab-
lished a connection with the Netherlands (i.e., the European part of the state)
itself. The latter group are given, on leaving Aruba, the right to vote in national
and European Parliament elections under Netherlands law, an outcome which the
AG saw as ‘not comprehensible’.58  It undermines completely the basis for arguing
57 Ibid., para. 128.
58 Ibid., para. 167.
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that Arubans, although Netherlands nationals and therefore EU citizens, are de-
nied the right to vote in European Parliament elections on the grounds that they
lack a relevant connection with the EU. It should be noted that Aruba has a
different status in relation to the EU and the EU Treaties from that ascribed to
Gibraltar, and is not directly affected by EU legislation in the same way as Gibraltar.
Thus in relation to Aruba, the European Parliament could not be described as a
legislature, within the meaning of Article 3 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR, which was
the basis for the reasoning in the Matthews case and thus the starting point for the
entire saga underpinning the Gibraltar case.
While the AG’s Opinion is a productive source of provocation about the future
of European citizenship, it ultimately leaves unresolved the tension between inter-
nal inclusivity and external exclusivity which invades all concepts of citizenship,
so long as the bounded nature of citizenship is treated as its central facet. He
seems instinctively to want to develop the exclusive aspects of European citizen-
ship, not least because he saw this as fostering closer European integration, and his
conclusions in the Gibraltar case seem to indicate a preference for European Par-
liament elections to be elections by ‘European’ citizens unless the member states
can demonstrate very good reasons why non-Europeans should be involved. On
the other hand, there are several points in the Opinion where the AG appears
simultaneously to recognise the attractiveness of an argument which opens out
electoral rights to non-nationals on the basis of a principle of affectedness. He
notes that
the democratic principle of universal suffrage upon which the European Union is
based…militates…in favour of recognising voting rights for the largest possible
number of persons, and there possibly also for foreigners established in a particu-
lar State, who, like citizens, are effectively subject to the measures approved by the
national and Community legislative authorities.59
If it is applied, of course, the principle of affectedness can challenge the bounded
conception of citizenship.
The Court on the Gibraltar case
In the Gibraltar case, the Court opted for a narrower approach than the AG to the
texts and arguments placed before it. It noted from the beginning that Spain was
looking for some means of establishing ‘a link between citizenship of the Union
and the right to vote and to stand as a candidate for the European Parliament, the
consequence of that link being that only citizens of the Union can have that right.’60
59 Ibid., para. 93.
60 Case C-145/04, para. 59.
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However, contrary to the contentions of Spain, it confirmed that Article 19(2) is
‘confined to applying the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of national-
ity’61  to the exercise of the right to vote for the European Parliament. Nor did it
find anything in either Article 190 EC or the 1976 Act on Direct Elections defin-
ing ‘expressly and precisely who are to be entitled to the right to vote and to stand
as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament.’62  It could derive no clear
conclusion that there was a clear link between citizenship of the Union and the
right to vote in European Parliament elections in Articles 189 or 190 EC or in the
provisions on citizenship of the Union. It repeated its favoured phrase from
Grzelczyk,63  whereby citizenship of the Union is ‘destined to be the fundamental
status’ of nationals of the member states, but then went on to state that this state-
ment ‘does not necessarily mean that the rights recognised by the Treaty are lim-
ited to citizens of the Union.’64  Thus to a greater extent than the AG, the Court
appears to opt for an open and outward-looking concept of citizenship for the
EU, under which citizenship rights may be constitutive of the status of the na-
tionals of member states, but the rights themselves are not necessarily confined to
citizens alone. However, a warning note should also be sounded for those who
seek to derive a stronger concept of Union citizenship from these words, for later
in the judgment the Court noted the highly segmented nature of European Par-
liamentary elections. Because of the way in which the elections are currently
organised,
an extension by a Member State of the right to vote at those elections to persons
other than its own nationals or other than citizens of the Union resident in its
territory affects only the choice of the representatives elected in that Member
State, and has no effect either on the choice or on the representatives elected in
the other Member States.65
This contrasts quite sharply with the approach on this issue taken by the AG, who
stressed the European nature of European Parliament elections.
In conclusion, the Court confirmed that it was ‘within the competence of each
Member State in compliance with Community law’ to define the persons entitled
to vote and stand in European Parliament elections, a conclusion which it bol-
stered also by a reference to the ‘constitutional traditions’ of the United Kingdom
in this matter, which include the extension of rights to vote in all UK elections to
61 Ibid., para. 66.
62 Ibid., para. 70.
63 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk v. Centre Public d’Aide Sociale d’Ottignes-Louvain-la-Neuve (CPAS),
[2001] ECR I-6193.
64 Case C-145/04, para. 74.
65 Ibid., para. 77.
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Commonwealth citizens.66  It should be noted that the AG himself did not find
any problems in the general context of EU law with the principle of member
states extending the right to vote to non-EU citizens, so on this matter the AG
and the Court are broadly at one. However, unlike the AG, the Court found no
impediment in the detailed text of the Act on Direct Elections and the commit-
ments made by the United Kingdom to organise European Parliament elections
including the territory of Gibraltar, consequent upon the judgment of the Court
of Human Rights in the Matthews case. Rather, given the imperative upon the
United Kingdom, the Court concluded that in applying its legislation to the spe-
cific case of Gibraltar, the United Kingdom
cannot be criticised for adopting the legislation necessary for the holding of such
elections under conditions equivalent, with the necessary changes, to those laid
down by the legislation applicable in the United Kingdom.67
This includes, of course, the definition of the franchise, which is the same in
Gibraltar as it is for the rest of the United Kingdom. It is worth noting that even
in its newest version, which moves some way towards a uniform electoral proce-
dure by at least requiring the representatives to be elected on the basis of propor-
tional representation, Article 8 of the Act on Direct Elections continues to provide
that ‘subject to the provisions of this Act, the electoral procedure shall be gov-
erned in each Member State by its national provisions’, and the first recital in the
preamble to the 2002 amendments provides that member states remain free ‘to
apply their national provisions’, subject to the limited restrictions in the Act.
The Court on the Aruba case
The Aruba case concerned not the extension of the right to vote beyond the scope
of Union citizenship, but rather its restriction, in this case on the basis of the place
of residence of the citizens in question. It is significant that the Court does ex-
pressly confirm that as nationals of one of the member states (sharing Netherlands
nationality with those resident in the Netherlands) ‘citizens’ of Aruba are indeed
citizens of the Union. It seems to limit its conclusion to those who ‘reside or live
in a territory which is one of the OCTs referred to in Article 299(3) EC’,68  but it
would seem equally logical to argue that citizenship of the Union is a personal
status of nationals of the member states which they carry with them wherever they
are. How else, logically, could the principle of consular and diplomatic protection
66 Ibid., paras. 78 and 79.
67 Ibid., para. 95.
68 Case C-300/04, para. 29.
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for Union citizens while in third countries enacted in Article 20 EC actually ap-
ply? It should surely not be limited only to those who are temporarily in third
countries, but must also extend to those with settled residence in third coun-
tries. 69
However, the Court also confirmed that as the Treaty contains no rules ex-
pressly stating who are to be entitled to vote and stand as a candidate for the
European Parliament, it remains a matter, in the current state of Community law,
for the competence of the member states.70  There is no unconditional right on
the part of nationals of the member states to vote for the European Parliament. In
particular, the member states may choose the criterion of residence to determine
who votes. In this context, it cited case-law of the Court of Human Rights con-
cluding that ‘the obligation to reside within national territory to be able to vote is
a requirement which is not, in itself, unreasonable or arbitrary.’71  However, the
exercise of national competence must occur in compliance with Community law.
This led the Court to consider whether an OCT was in the same situation, with
regard to Community law, as Gibraltar. It concluded that, unlike the case of
Gibraltar, the European Parliament cannot be regarded as a legislature with regard
to the OCTs. Hence the Matthews doctrine at issue in Gibraltar case does not
apply. Moreover, Article 19(2) and Directive 93/109 are of no assistance to the
applicants in this case, as they concern only the application of the principle of
non-discrimination on grounds of nationality.
Where the Court does support the applicants is, as with the AG, in relation to
the application of the equal treatment principle as between different groups of
Netherlands nationals. It confirmed that the principle of equal treatment or non-
discrimination is a general principle of Community law,72  and concluded that
‘the relevant comparison is between a Netherlands national resident in the Neth-
erlands Antilles or Aruba and one residing in a non-member country.’73  As the
general principle of equal treatment includes the duty not to treat differently
those who are in like situations, and since the two groups identified have in com-
mon that they are not resident in the Netherlands, there is a prima facie case that
they should be treated alike. In fact, the latter group can vote in European Parlia-
ment elections (on the argument that this helps to maintain their connection to
the Netherlands), whereas the former cannot. However, this ‘connection’ ratio-
nale breaks down when it becomes apparent that Netherlands nationals resident
69 See F. Geyer, The External Dimension of EU Citizenship: Arguing for Effective Protection of
Citizens Abroad, CEPS Policy Brief, No. 134, July 2007.
70 Case C-300/04, para. 45.
71 Ibid., para. 54, citing Melnychenko v. Ukraine, Appl. No. 17707/02, para. 56, 18 Oct. 2004.
72 Case C-300/04, para. 57.
73 Ibid., para. 58.
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in Aruba gain the right to vote if they leave Aruba for a third country, since they
are then covered by the same general Netherlands external voting legislation. The
Court concluded that the Netherlands was under an obligation to provide an
objective justification for its difference in treatment, and that given this irrational-
ity in the legislative scheme, it had failed to do so.74
The final section of the case is concerned with guidance to the national court
on the question of redress. What was to be done about the fact that the applicants
(along with their fellow Arubans) had been wrongly excluded from participating
in the 2004 European Parliament elections? In accordance with its normal prin-
ciples of remedies, the Court held that in the absence of relevant EU legislation,
this is a matter for the national court, subject to the usual caveats that rules gov-
erning redress must be no less favourable than those governing rights which origi-
nate in domestic law (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render
impossible or excessively difficult in practice the exercise of rights conferred by the
EU legal order (principle of effectiveness).75  However, the Court also made it
clear that it was not excluded that state liability for the loss caused by the infringe-
ment of EU law could be included in the package of remedies made available, but
the Court expressed no view about the various options such as re-running the
elections or appointing special representatives to advise the Dutch MEPs on be-
half of the excluded Aruban electorate which were put forward by the parties. In
the event, when the case was remitted to it for final decision, the referring Raad
van State concluded that the relevant provisions of the electoral law had to be set
aside and the municipal authorities’ decision to refuse registration had to be an-
nulled. However, the further issues of redress could not be finally disposed of by
the Raad van State. It indicated that the failure identified by the Court of Justice
could be addressed either by extending electoral rights to Arubans, or by removing
external voting rights and applying a narrower residence principal to the right to
vote. This is a political choice, which the Dutch legislature must make before the
next elections in 2009.76
Implications of the judgments
It is apparent from both the earlier historical review and the subsequent detailed
analysis of the Gibraltar and Aruba cases that the political representation of Euro-
pean citizens has come a very long way since the inception of the European Com-
munities. We have moved from the sole site of contestation of these rights being
within and across the European political institutions and the member states to a
74 Ibid., para. 60.
75 Ibid., para. 67.
76 Judgment of 21 Nov. 2006; personal communication Monica Claes, 22 Nov. 2006.
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situation where courts are likely to be increasingly involved in deliberating about
the scope and nature of those rights. But, as noted at the outset, the two cases
under review were driven by particular sets of political circumstances which do
not directly relate to European integration, or the question of political representa-
tion within the EU as such. Thus it was the ongoing sovereignty dispute between
the United Kingdom and Spain over Gibraltar and the continuing negotiations
about the status of Aruba and the Antilles within the Kingdom of the Netherlands
which provided the opportunity structures within which the cases could come
before the Court of Justice. At one level, the cases have quite narrow rationes. In
Gibraltar this concerned how a member state resolved tensions between a human
rights imperative resulting from a case before the Court of Human Rights, its
constitutional traditions on electoral rights, the restrictive provisions of the Act
on Direct Elections in relation to the territorial scope, and its freedom of manoeu-
vre in relation to the organisation of direct elections. Aruba seems a relatively
straightforward application of the equal treatment principle, which binds the
member states when they are acting within the scope of Community law; clearly
they are when organising European Parliament elections, notwithstanding their
freedom of action under the Act on Direct Elections. These are not, as such,
citizenship cases, or cases directly addressing the scope and nature of political
representation in the EU. Neither of the two cases addressed directly the meaning
of the electoral rights granted to EU citizens by Article 19, although indirectly
they have confirmed that these provisions are indeed equal treatment rules.
While Gibraltar is probably the more immediately politically sensitive of the
two cases, that does not of itself make this the more significant one. It is, of
course, important to note that the Court explicitly recognises the electoral par-
ticularities of one member state as being a ‘constitutional tradition’ which de-
serves respect, and it should also be noted that the Court projects a broadly inclusive
notion of the electoral franchise for the European Parliament, throughout its judg-
ment. On the other hand, it is arguable that the Aruba may be the more signifi-
cant of the two cases. From this case, it can be argued that the combination of the
organisation of European-wide elections to the European Parliament, albeit thus
far on a segmented national basis, with the creation of a Europe-wide personal
status of ‘citizen of the Union’ can result in quite substantial intrusions into the
national electoral sovereignty of the member states.
What is notable is the willingness of both the Court of Justice and the AG to
extend the protection of the general principles of Community law to a group of
citizens of the Union on a personal basis, notwithstanding that they are not ‘con-
nected’ in any way to the EU as single market or to the European Parliament as a
legislature. Nor indeed are they even residing in another member state, which has
been the usual trigger in earlier citizenship cases. This is the true innovation of the
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77 Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691.
78 Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] ECR I-7091.
79 See Cases C-11 and 12/06 Morgan v. Bezirksregierung Köln, Bucher v. Landrat des Kreises Düren,
23 Oct. 2007.
case, and is in many respects far more significant for citizenship as a whole than it
is for the narrower question of the right to vote for the European Parliament. The
equal treatment principle from which the Arubans benefit is not the general prin-
ciple of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality which has pervaded the
vast majority of the cases hitherto on EU citizenship since as Martínez Sala,77  nor
the right of free movement and the right of residence, at issue in cases such as
Baumbast 78 and Morgan,79  but rather a general principle of equal treatment which
protects persons from irrational and unjust legislative outcomes, without refer-
ence to some physical or social characteristic which they may have (like gender,
age or nationality). It is hard to see how the Court could reach that conclusion if
it did not have in its mind, notwithstanding its failure to state this explicitly as the
AG chose to, that the right to vote in European Parliament elections is indeed an
important incident, or right, of Union citizens.
It would seem that the Court has concluded, while upholding the clear state-
ment in Article 1(2) of Directive 93/109 that ‘nothing in the Directive shall affect
each Member State’s provisions concerning the right to vote or stand as a candi-
date of its nationals who reside outside its electoral territory’ (emphasis added), that
in fact other provisions of EU law may indeed constrain such provisions. In this
case, it is the general principle of non-discrimination or equal treatment. It could
in future be other facets of EU citizenship, such as the right of residence, or argu-
ments focused on the exercise of the right of free movement, which is now often
the frame within which the Court of Justice is approaching citizenship cases. Clearly
the EU, at its present state of integration, lies some way away from a situation in
which there could be a harmonisation of national rules on external voting, but a
challenge to general exclusionary external voting rules (e.g., in Ireland) or limited
external voting rights (e.g., in the United Kingdom where they are limited to
fifteen years) could be regarded as a logical next step of the holding in the Aruba
case. But this may not be in relation to European Parliamentary elections, absent
another situation arising such as that in Aruba, but rather in relation to voting in
national elections. EU citizens resident in other member states, who find them-
selves unable to vote in any national elections as a result of the combination of
restrictive naturalisation rules, restrictive external voting rules, and non-existent
rights to vote as EU citizens in such elections, may find fruitful lines of argument
which they can develop on the basis of Aruba in combination with the recent
citizenship case-law on freedom of movement such as Morgan.
186 Jo Shaw EuConst 4 (2008)
80 See M. Dougan, ‘The Constitutional Dimension to the Case Law on Union Citizenship’,
European Law Review (2006), p. 613.
Returning to the Article 19 electoral rights (local and European Parliamen-
tary), it is conceivable that Aruba could give a green light to challenges to the
effects of some national rules which apparently restrict the exercise of the rights,
but which in practice imperil their very existence. A challenge could be envisaged
to the derogation given to Luxembourg in the European Parliament and local
elections directives, allowing the imposition of lengthy qualifying residence peri-
ods for EU citizens seeking to vote or stand in those elections where certain thresh-
olds relating to the numbers of resident non-national EU citizens of voting age
have been passed. This is notwithstanding the fact that such whole state deroga-
tions are explicitly provided for in Article 19. At the very least, the Court may be
asked to assess whether the solution chosen in the two directives is proportionate
and appropriate to the specific situation of Luxembourg as a member state with a
very small overall population and a high population of non-national EU citizens.
Such an approach should also draw on the distinction made in citizenship cases
such as Baumbast between the existence of the basic free movement right in Article
18 EC, which is directly effective, and the conditions which member states may
place upon its exercise, which must be proportionate.80
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